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Your ZIP Isn't My ZIP: 50 Parsers, 14 Ambiguities, One File Interpreted Two Ways

Forum topic · 二一 · 2026-05-13

Summary

A USENIX Security 2025 paper reveals that the ZIP format specification contains numerous ambiguities, causing different ZIP parsers to interpret the same file in different ways. Researchers built ZipDiff, a differential fuzzer that systematically tested 50 ZIP parsers across 19 programming languages, finding parsing ambiguities between nearly every pair of parsers. They cataloged 14 types of parsing ambiguities, 10 of which are newly discovered. These semantic gaps enable real attacks: bypassing secure email gateways where attachments appear safe to gateway parsers but extract malicious content on clients; fooling VS Code extension signature verification; and tampering with signed JAR files such as Spring Boot applications where signature checks pass but executed code is altered. The work earned bug bounties from Gmail, Coremail, and Zoho, plus three CVEs affecting Go, LibreOffice, and Spring Boot. The core insight: every ambiguity in a specification is a potential security vulnerability when independent teams implement it separately.

ZIP is one of the oldest and most ubiquitous file formats in computing — nearly every compressed archive, Office document, Android APK, and Java JAR on your machine uses ZIP as its container. But a paper at USENIX Security 2025 found that the ZIP format specification itself contains significant ambiguities, allowing different ZIP parsers across programming languages to interpret the same file in different ways.

The Research

The researchers developed a differential fuzzer called ZipDiff and systematically tested 50 ZIP parsers covering 19 programming languages. The result: nearly every pair of parsers exhibits some kind of parsing ambiguity. They cataloged 14 types of parsing ambiguities, 10 of which are newly discovered.

Why This Matters

When a single ZIP file can be interpreted as two different contents by two different parsers, attackers gain a "semantic gap" between them. Real-world attack scenarios include:

  • Bypassing secure email gateways: an attachment appears "safe" to the gateway's ZIP parser, but the user's mail client extracts different, malicious content
  • Fooling VS Code extension signature verification: the extension package appears to pass signature checks, but actually loads unsigned malicious code
  • Tampering with signed JAR files: Spring Boot's signature verification passes, while the code actually executed has been altered

Impact

Through these vulnerabilities, the paper earned bug bounties from Gmail, Coremail, and Zoho, as well as three CVEs (Go, LibreOffice, Spring Boot).

Core Insight

When multiple teams read the same "specification" and implement it independently, every ambiguity in that specification is a potential security vulnerability.

*Reference: "My ZIP Isn't Your ZIP" — USENIX Security 2025*

Tags

#zip-format#parser-ambiguity#differential-fuzzing#supply-chain-security#signature-bypass#usenix-security-2025#zipdiff#cve

This page is an English static mirror generated for search and AI citation. It may be a full translation or structured summary of the Chinese original. Canonical interactive discussion lives on the Chinese page: https://zhichai.net/topic/177619974