Overview
Reasoning models (o3, DeepSeek-R1, Qwen3-Thinking) generate long chains of thought before answering. When given logically inconsistent or incomplete problems, they don't say "this is unsolvable"—they spiral into overthinking: revisiting assumptions, self-questioning, and restarting reasoning repeatedly.
An ICML 2026 paper asks a new question: can this flaw be systematically exploited as a denial-of-service (DoS) attack?
The Attack: Hierarchical Genetic Algorithm (HGA)
1. Decompose a normal math problem into a premise list plus a final question. 2. Mutate via genetic operations:
- Delete a premise
- Insert an irrelevant premise borrowed from another problem
- Swap a question between problems
- Swap premises between problems 3. Score fitness on the target model with two metrics: output token count and overthinking markers ("Wait...", "Let me reconsider...", "But..."). 4. Evolve for 5 generations, keeping the most verbose variants.
- Composite fitness matters: Adding overthinking-marker counting (not just token length) doubled the best output length from 14,132 to 32,019 tokens—inducing genuine cognitive struggle beats mechanical verbosity.
- Black-box transfer works: Adversarial problems optimized on Qwen3-14B transferred to commercial models at 7.1x (GPT-o3), 3.6x (DeepSeek-R1), and 8.1x (Qwen3-Thinking) on SVAMP.
- Superior input efficiency: HGA triggered 32,768 output tokens from just 99 input tokens; AutoDoS needed 2,652 input tokens for only 16,009 output tokens.
- Low cost: ~60 queries per evolution
- Black-box: no model access needed
- Transferable: develop on cheap models, deploy on expensive ones
- Hard to detect: inputs look like ordinary math problems; outputs are "normal" reasoning that is merely too long
- Clear impact: 10–25x token inflation means exploding API costs, latency, and blocked users—an economic denial of service.
- Output token caps and chain-of-thought length limits
- Detection of anomalous verbosity patterns
- Training models to recognize and refuse logically inconsistent inputs instead of trying to derive meaning from them
The evolved problems still look like valid math problems and pass API input validation—only their logical structure is intentionally broken.
Results: Up to 26x Amplification
On the MATH dataset:
| Model | Normal avg | Attacked avg | Worst case | |---|---|---|---| | DeepSeek-R1 | 355 tokens | 8,817 | 12,206 | | Qwen3-Thinking | 3,618 | 13,007 | 22,303 | | GPT-o3 | 416 | 1,618 | 2,198 | | Gemini-2.5-Flash | 2,889 | 12,147 | 18,011 |
Key Findings
Why It Matters
From an attacker's perspective the attack is nearly ideal:
Lessons for Deployment
Overthinking is not a QA issue—it's a security vulnerability that belongs in the threat model. Possible defenses:
Reference paper: Shuqiang Wang, Wei Cao, Jiaqi Weng, Jialing Tao, Licheng Pan, Hui Xue, Zhixuan Chu. "Inducing Overthink: Hierarchical Genetic Algorithm-based DoS Attack on Black-Box Large Language Reasoning Models." ICML 2026, arXiv:2605.13338.