Academic Integrity Report: Blockchain-Based Efficient Access Control With Handover Policy in IoV-Enabled Intelligent Transportation System

Academic fraud report · Geng Detector

Summary

This report flags four concrete concerns in the IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology paper 'Blockchain-Based Efficient Access Control With Handover Policy in IoV-Enabled Intelligent Transportation System' (DOI: 10.1109/TVT.2023.3322637). The overall verdict is highly suspicious. Key issues include: (1) a near-verbatim duplicated paragraph in the Introduction across pages 3010-3011; (2) a serious notational inconsistency in the Dynamic Vehicle Addition Phase (Section IV) where parameters tied to an existing vehicle (subscript vi) appear in what should be a fresh-vehicle registration; (3) a methodological gap in Section VII where Table V omits the execution time for the Chebyshev chaotic-map operation that is central to the protocol, yet Table VI reports precise four-decimal authentication times (2.8551 ms and 3.5885 ms); and (4) inconsistent ProVerif tool version citations (1.93 vs 2.03) across Sections I.B, I.C, and VI. Findings 2 and 3 are rated severe and may indicate protocol design sloppiness or fabricated benchmark values. Confidence is moderate-to-high for the textual and tool-version issues; lower for fabrication claims, which require raw benchmark scripts for confirmation.

Verdict

Highly suspicious (🟠). Multiple indicators of template-driven, copy-paste authorship and inconsistent methodology. Two issues (Findings 2 and 3) are severe and warrant an Errata or formal investigation.

Key findings

Duplicated paragraph in Introduction: An entire block describing IoV security threats is repeated almost verbatim across page 3010 and page 3011, with only minor modification of the final clause.
Variable-name mismatch in Dynamic Vehicle Addition Phase: Step NVA3 (Section IV) refers to parameters of an existing vehicle (MId_vi, α_vi, β_vi, γ_vi, X_vi) inside text describing the registration of a new vehicle (suffix _new).
Missing benchmark data for chaotic-map operation: Table V lists execution times for SHA-256 (0.112 ms), ECC point multiplication (2.246 ms), and bilinear pairing (6.801 ms), but omits Chebyshev polynomial time T_cm. Table VI nonetheless reports BACHP-IoV initial and handover authentication times of 2.8551 ms and 3.5885 ms to four decimal places.
Inconsistent ProVerif version citations: Section I.B states ProVerif 1.93, while Sections I.C and VI state ProVerif 2.03.

Evidence highlights

Finding 1 (pp. 3010–3011): Both passages begin identically with "Inherently, IoV-enabled ITS requires frequent message communications among various entities of the system through insecure wireless channels. This allures potential adversary agents to launch several active and passive security attacks like eavesdropping, revealing, modifying, deleting, or intercepting communicated messages[14],[15]. In a real-time scenario of an ITS, the presence of such security vulnerabilities may lead to ..."; the first ends with "several catastrophic results" and the second with "catastrophic results like fatal accidents, etc."
Finding 2 (p. 3018, Step NVA3): Text mixes _new identifiers (e.g., α_new, β_new, OBU_new) with vi-indexed identifiers (MId_vi, P_τ, α_vi, β_vi, γ_vi, X_vi) in the same sentence describing the upload to blockchain and loading into the new OBU.
Finding 3 (p. 3021, Tables V–VI): Table V entries: SHA-256 = 0.112 ms; ECC Point Multiplication = 2.246 ms; Bilinear Pairing = 6.801 ms. No row for Chebyshev/chaotic-map polynomial. Table VI comparative computational-cost row for BACHP-IoV: initial authentication = 2.8551 ms; handover authentication = 3.5885 ms. No derivation or justification provided for the T_cm value used.
Finding 4 (p. 3011; Section VI): "using the ProVerif 1.93 simulation tool" (Sec. I.B) vs. "using the ProVerif 2.03 simulation tool" (Sec. I.C and Sec. VI).

Notes

DOI: 10.1109/TVT.2023.3322637
All numeric values are reproduced verbatim from the report and not independently verified against the published PDF.
Severity ratings from the original report: Finding 1 = 🟠 (sloppy writing), Finding 2 = 🔴 (core protocol logic flaw), Finding 3 = 🔴 (possible fabrication of benchmark figures), Finding 4 = 🟡 (template reuse artifact).
The report recommends requesting the Chebyshev-map benchmark source, NS-3 simulation code, and raw ProVerif scripts from the authors; posting the concerns on PubPeer; and, pending response, requesting an Errata or journal editorial review.
AI-assisted analysis; any final determination of misconduct should be made by the relevant institutional or editorial body.