Paper Overview
Field: Machine Learning Authors: Mingyang Liu, Asuman Ozdaglar, Tiancheng Yu Published: 2025-06-11 arXiv: 2506.08285
Abstract
We study regret minimization in repeated games with adaptive opponents who can respond based on histories of play. Standard external regret measures fail to capture this adaptability. To address this, we introduce Repeated Policy Regret (RP-Regret), a game-theoretic metric measuring the difference between realized accumulated utility and the best-in-hindsight accumulated utility when all players can respond to the history of play.
Algorithms Proposed
The paper presents three algorithms to minimize RP-Regret under different conditions:
1. Optimization-oracle-based algorithm — leveraging an optimization oracle for the minimization task. 2. Convex linearization surrogate algorithm — using convex surrogate objectives. 3. Direct minimization algorithm — designed for opponents whose strategies change slowly over time.
Significance
By introducing RP-Regret, the authors extend regret analysis beyond external regret to settings where strategic adaptation by all players is possible, offering a more faithful benchmark for performance in repeated games with responsive opponents.
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