Paper Overview
Research Area: ML Authors: Mingyang Liu, Asuman Ozdaglar, Tiancheng Yu Release Date: 2025-06-11 arXiv: 2506.08285
Chinese Abstract
This paper studies regret minimization in repeated games with adaptive opponents. The standard external regret metric cannot capture this adaptivity. To address this, the authors introduce Repeated Policy Regret (RP-Regret), a game-theoretic metric that measures the difference between realized utility and the best-in-hindsight utility when all players can respond to the history of play. They propose three algorithms to minimize RP-Regret, including an algorithm based on an optimization oracle, a convex linearization proxy algorithm, and a direct minimization algorithm for opponents whose strategies change slowly.
Original Abstract
We study regret minimization in repeated games with adaptive opponents who can respond based on histories of play. We introduce Repeated Policy Regret (RP-Regret), a game-theoretic metric measuring the difference between realized and best-in-hindsight accumulated utility when all players can respond to the history of play. We propose three algorithms to minimize RP-Regret under different conditions.
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